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) Priority No. 2 
Appellants, in accordance with Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, move this Court for a rehearing on the 
issues decided in this case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION SHOULD BE REVERSED 
BASED UPON THE ABSENCE OF SPECIFIC FINDINGS 
RELATING TO THE EXISTENCE OF A CONTRACT. 
Appellants contend that the trial court failed to make the 
necessary findings with regard to the existence of a contract 
between the Plaintiffs and the Defendants (See Appellants' 
original brief at 16-24, Appellants' reply brief at 2-9). The 
Court, in its Memorandum Decision dated May 11, 1995, failed to 
address the major issue raised by the Appellants. 
A. The Trial Court must make Findings as to Whether or not 
the Contract is Integrated and Unambiguous. 
The Appellants contend that the trial court in this case 
failed to make the necessary findings with regard to the written 
and oral contracts entered into by the parties (Appellants' brief 
at 2-10, Appellants' reply brief at 2-9). 
The facts of this case reveal that the Plaintiffs and the 
Defendants Golightly entered into a Sales Agreement on September 
9, 1988. Under the terms of the Sales Agreement, the Plaintiffs 
were to furnish the site and the Defendants Golightly agreed to 
construct, 
3. . . . Said residence and improvements and provide 
and furnish all labor and materials required for such 
construction and the completion thereof strictly 
in accordance with the plans and specifications 
approved and signed . . . The work to be done by the 
contractor shall include, but shall not be limited to, 
all excavating, rough grading, concrete work, masonry, 
lumber, carpentry, interior trim, labor, sheet rock, 
pile and/or linoleum work, iron work, sheet metal 
work, . . . All complete as specified in the plans and 
specifications. 
4. The owner, for and in consideration of the full, 
complete and faithful performance of this agreement 
by the contractor and his payment of all bills 
incurred in the construction, agrees to pay or cause 
to be paid to the contractor the sum of $117,100.00 
5. No changes in the plans or specifications shall be 
made by the contractor without the written order of the 
owner . . . The amount to be paid by the owner or 
allowed by the contractor by virtue of such extras or 
changes, as agreed by the owner and contractor shall 
be stated in such order . . . . 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 5, Addendum No. 1 to Appellants' original 
brief. 
The parties signed a Building Loan Agreement and Assignment 
of Account that included Deseret Bank on September 21, 1988 
(Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 9, Addendum No. 2). Section one of the 
document required the contractor to commence construction within 
thirty days of the date of the Agreement and to complete 
construction within six months of the date of the Agreement. 
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Section five of the Agreement allowed the contractor to take 
draws equal to the value of the labor and materials actually 
incorporated in the improvements. 
Despite the fact that the contract between the parties 
clearly stated that "no changes . . . shall be made . . . without 
the written order of the owner . . . , " the trial court allowed 
extensive testimony regarding contemporaneous oral statements and 
oral modifications of the contract, over the objection of 
Plaintiffs1 counsel (Appellants1 brief at 16-29, Appellants' 
reply brief at 2-17). 
The mandatory duty of the trial court was recently restated 
by the Utah Supreme Court in Hall v. Process Instruments and 
Control, Inc., 257 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 (Utah 1995). In that case, 
the plaintiff was attempting to introduce parol evidence to 
establish that her employment agreement was not integrated or was 
ambiguous. Obviously, it is the Defendants in this case that 
are contending that the written agreements between the parties 
are not integrated and therefore that the introduction of parol 
evidence is proper. In explaining the duty of the trial court, 
the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
This court has noted that as a principle of 
contract interpretation, the parol evidence rule has a 
very narrow application. Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 
P.2d 663 (Utah 1985). Simply stated, the rule 
operates, in the absence of fraud or other invalidating 
causes, to exclude evidence of contemporaneous 
conversations, representations, or statements offered 
for the purpose of varying or adding to the terms of an 
integrated contract. Id. (citing Eie v. St. 
Benedicts's Hosp., 638 P.2d 1190, 1192 (Utah 1981); See 
also Restatement (Second) of Contracts 213-14 (1981). 
Under this general rule, "an apparently complete and 
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certain writing will be conclusively presumed to 
contain the whole agreement." Eie, 638 P.2d at 1194. 
Thus, before considering the applicability of the parol 
evidence rule in a contact dispute, the court must 
first determine that the parties intended the writing 
to be an integration. To resolve this question of 
fact, any relevant evidence is admissible. Union Bank, 
707 P.2d at 665 (citing Eie, 638 P.2d at 1194). 
Once a court determines that an agreement is 
integrated, parol evidence, although not admissible to 
vary or contradict the clear and unambiguous terms of 
the contract, is admissible to clarify ambiguous terms. 
Colonial Leasing Co. v. Larsen Bros. Constr., 731 P.2d 
438, 487 (Utah 1986). The application of the parol 
evidence rule therefore involves two steps. First, 
the court must determine whether the agreement is 
integrated. If the court finds the agreement is 
integrated, then parol evidence may be admitted only if 
the court makes a subsequent determination that the 
language of the agreement is ambiguous. 
Id. at 24. 
In the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, the trial court absolutely failed to make any findings as to 
whether or not the written agreements signed by the parties were 
integrated and/or ambiguous (Exhibit No. 6 to Appellants' brief, 
R. 428-441). The language used by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Hall, supra,, is not discretionary. The trial court must make 
findings with regard to integration and ambiguity. 
This Court, in its Memorandum Decision indicates that 
"extrinsic evidence of subsequent modifications to a written 
contract" is admissible. In other words, parol evidence is 
admissible to show oral modifications of a written contract 
(Memorandum Decision at 2). 
However, even if parol evidence regarding subsequent 
agreements is admissible, the trial court must make findings that 
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a subsequent contract, with all of the requisite elements, has 
been made between the parties. Accordingly, even if this Court 
finds that some of the parol evidence was admissible to establish 
the existence of a subsequent oral agreement, the Findings of the 
trial court in this case are deficient in that the court never 
extrapolates the terms of specific subsequent oral agreements 
from the evidence. The failure to enter adequate findings of 
fact on material issues is reversible error. The findings must 
be articulated with sufficient detail so that the basis of the 
ultimate conclusion can be understood. Reid v. Mutual of Omaha 
Insurance Co., 776 P.2d 896 (Utah 1989). The appellate court can 
only grant a trial court's decision the usual deference when the 
findings are sufficiently detailed to disclose the evidentiary 
basis for the court's decision. Woodward v. Fazzio, 175 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 70 (Utah Ct. of App. 1991). 
B. The Trial Court's Findings are Clearly Insufficient 
and Mandate Reversal. 
Under the terms of the Sales Agreement dated September 9, 
1988, the Defendants assumed the obligation to complete, in 
accordance with the plans and specifications approved and signed, 
all excavating, rough grating, concrete work, masonry, lumber, 
carpentry, interior trim, labor, sheet rock, pile and/or linoleum 
work, iron work and sheet metal work (Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 5, 
Addendum No. 1 to Appellants' original brief). The testimony 
further clearly established that only four signed change orders 
were signed by the Plaintiffs (Appellants' brief at 8). The 
Defendants clearly extended monies far in excess of the contract 
5 
amount (Appellants' brief at 9-10), and there were a large number 
of irregularities in the construction of the home (Appellants' 
brief at 11-12). 
With the factual background set out above, the findings and 
conclusions of the trial court are clearly inadequate. 
In Findings numbered 3 and 4, the trial court notes the 
11
 significant disagreement between the parties" and the 
"contradictions" between the evidence offered by the various 
sides. Although the court notes the disparity in the testimony, 
the court makes no findings as to which testimony be found 
credible and/or believable. These findings alone, without 
identifying the testimony that the trial court did not believe, 
are useless in understanding what the trial court ruled and the 
basis of that ruling (R. 440). 
In Finding number 6, the trial court referred to changes in 
the contract that were discussed between Clay (the Plaintiffs' 
son and the Defendants' foreman) and the Plaintiffs. The trial 
court then stated that "these changes would be made and 
incorporated as a result of these conversations . . ." (R. 439). 
The Findings of the trial court fail to identify what changes 
were discussed and agreed upon by the Plaintiffs and the 
Defendants. The trial court's simple reference to the fact that 
agreements subsequent to the original contract were made does not 
answer the critical question of what change or changes the court 
is referring to and the evidentiary basis the court is using to 
substantiate a finding of a subsequent agreement. 
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Finding number 7 is another confusing paragraph. The trial 
court notes the existence of conflicting testimony as to whether 
the construction plans were properly drawn. The court then 
stated: 
As the project was being completed and changes 
were requested, most of the requested changes were 
not reflected on the plans even though the Plaintiffs 
acknowledged requesting or consenting to changes. 
R. at 439. The Finding is deficient in that it fails to identify 
which of the many contested changes and irregularities, the court 
found were to be included within the scheme of subsequent 
agreements of factual situations outlined in Finding number 7. 
The Finding is further insufficient in that it fails to point to 
any evidence wherein the parties agreed to proceed by oral 
modification. Thus, after reading Finding number 7, the 
litigants do not know what issues were meant to be included in 
paragraph 7 and the evidentiary basis upon which the Finding was 
made. 
In Finding number 8, the court refers to the fact that the 
Plaintiffs maintained control over certain areas of the 
construction. The court noted that "the Defendants did not have 
control over these areas as the Plaintiffs desired to be 
responsible for them." The question is, what does the 
"Plaintiffs' desire" have to do with the issues in the case. In 
order for the written contract of the parties, which assigns 
specific responsibility, to be replaced, the court had to make 
findings of a subsequent oral agreement. The Finding is totally 
insufficient to establish the existence of a subsequent oral 
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agreement and/or any impossibility of the Defendants to perform 
in accordance with the contract. Further, the Finding fails to 
relate to any claim of the Plaintiff. For instance, the court 
fails to find that particular costs or expenses were to be 
excused by the Plaintiffs' assertion of control. The Finding 
fails to specify any specific dollar amounts attributable to the 
conduct (R. at 438). 
Finding number 9 indicates that the sub-contractors hired by 
the Plaintiff exceeded allowable amounts but failed to make any 
finding as to the dollar amounts and therefore, the impact on the 
Plaintiffsf claim. 
In Finding number 15, the trial court explicitly found that 
the Defendants' failed to construct the residence in accordance 
with the original plans and specifications. The court then found 
that: 
The plans and specifications were changed by the 
parties many times by both writing and verbal 
understanding. 
R. at 436. Again, the trial court fails to list even one change 
that it found to have been orally made by the parties. It is 
impossible for the Appellants to argue the sufficiency of the 
court's evidentiary finding when the trial court fails to list 
the issue and the terms of the oral modification. Even if an 
oral modification to the contract was made, the Defendants' 
conduct may have breached that oral modification. However, 
without even a vague reference to the issue and the terms of the 
modified agreement, the Appellants have no basis upon which to 
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argue the sufficiency of the evidence or the legal sufficiency of 
the finding. 
In summary, the trial court failed to make any findings as 
to whether or not the two written agreements of the parties were 
intended to represent an integrated contract. The court made no 
finding as to whether any of the terms in written agreements were 
ambiguous. 
Recognizing that this Court, in its Memorandum Decision 
acknowledged the admissibility of parol evidence to establish 
subsequent agreements, the findings of the trial court are still 
insufficient. The court failed to specifically find the terms of 
any subsequent agreement. The trial court's reference to 
subsequent agreements failed to mention any specific issues and 
further failed to identify the terms of the subsequent agreement, 
upon which the parties conduct could be gauged by this Court. In 
essence, the Appellants are required to speculate and this Court 
is required to guess what contracts the court found to have 
existed and the terms of those contracts. Both the Appellants 
and this Court must speculate as to how those agreements shaped 
the specific claims raised by the Plaintiffs. An example is 
appropriate. The trial court could certainly find that the 
parties written agreement with regard to responsibility for 
excavation had been changed by a subsequent oral agreement. 
However, the court should define specifically the terms of that 
subsequent agreement. The parties could have agreed that the 
entire responsibility for excavation was changed to the 
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Plaintiffs or could have found that only a small item regarding 
excavation was to be channeled to the Plaintiffs. Only when the 
terms of the subsequent agreement are described by the trial 
court, can the parties conduct be measured against the terms of 
the agreement. If the trial court fails to divulge its findings 
with regard to the elements of the subsequent agreement, there is 
no basis upon which to gauge the parties conduct or review the 
trial court's propriety in making the evidentiary finding. 
It is respectfully submitted that this Court's finding that 
parol evidence is admissible to show oral modification of a 
written contract and that the parol evidence was properly 
admitted by the trial court, is not dispositive of the issues 
raised by the Appellants. The case law is clear that after 
hearing the extrinsic evidence, the trial court had an obligation 
to enter findings as to the elements of the contract it found to 
exist. If the trial court found subsequent modifications of that 
contract, the trial court was obligated to detail the terms of 
the subsequent agreements and how the conduct of the parties 
compared to their contractual obligations. The trial court in 
this case simply failed to identify what contract or contracts 
were entered into by the parties. The court failed to make any 
findings as to integration or ambiguity. Although finding that 
the unspecified contract or contracts had been modified, the 
trial court failed to state what the terms of the amended 
contract were and how the parties conducted themselves with 
regard to the amended agreements. The findings are insufficient 
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to meet the test of Rule 52(a) of finding the facts "specially 
and [stating] separately its conclusions of law thereon . . . ." 
The trial court's decision must be reversed based upon the clear 
mandate of Rule 52(a) U.R.C.P. and the interpreting case law. 
POINT II: THE APPELLANTS MET THEIR OBLIGATION WITH 
REGARD TO MARSHALING THE EVIDENCE AND DEMONSTRATING 
THE INSUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE 
TRIAL COURT'S DECISION. 
The Appellants contended that the properly marshalled 
evidence was insufficient to support the trial court's findings 
(Appellants1 brief at 29-38, Appellants reply brief at 18-22). 
In ruling on the Plaintiffs' claim, this Court stated that: 
Although Plaintiffs acknowledge their duty to 
marshall the evidence when challenging the trial 
court's findings, Plaintiffs advance the novel concept 
that because they believe the evidence supporting the 
findings to be inadmissible parol evidence, they are 
relieved from the burden of marshalling the evidence. 
However, Plaintiffs have failed to support their 
innovative theory with supporting case law. 
Therefore, because we find that the evidence was 
properly admitted, Plaintiffs have failed to fulfill 
their marshalling duty and, on this basis, we decline 
to reach this issue. 
Id. at 2-3. 
The Plaintiffs' "novel concept" has been repeatedly used by 
the Utah Appellate Courts. Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure provides that "[i]n all actions tried upon the facts 
without a jury . . . the court shall find the facts specially and 
state separately its conclusions of law thereon . . . ." The 
importance of adequate findings of fact has been continually 
stressed by the Appellate Courts. State v. Vigil, 164 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 28, 30 (Utah App. 1991). This Court has repeatedly stated 
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that: 
. . . if we are to determine whether the evidence 
adduced at trial supports the trial court's findings, 
the findings must embody sufficient detail and include 
enough subsidiary facts to clearly show the evidence 
upon which they are grounded, (Emphasis added.) 
Woodward v. Fazzio, supra at 71. See also Acton v. Deliran, 737 
P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987); Bastian v. King, 661 P.2d 953, 957 
(Utah 1983); Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1979). 
As noted in State v. Lovegren, 798 P. 2d 767, 771 (Utah App. 
1990), the absence of adequate findings of fact makes it 
virtually impossible to conduct a meaningful review of the 
decision's evidentiary basis. 
In Woodward, supra, the appellee contended that the 
appellant, Fazzio had failed to properly marshal the evidence. 
In response, this Court stated: 
Fazzio, in his brief and at oral argument, 
characterized his appeal as a challenge to the trial 
court's factual findings. Accordingly, he attempted to 
marshal the evidence, as is required for such a 
challenge. See In re Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 
886 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 
(Utah 1987). However, the marshaling effort was 
largely ineffectual by reason of the conclusory nature 
of the trial court's findings of fact. 
"The process of marshaling the evidence serves the 
important function of reminding litigants and 
appellate courts of the broad deference owed to the 
fact finder at trial." State v. Moore, 802 P. 2d 732 
(Utah App. 1990). However, we will only grant this 
difference when the findings of fact are sufficiently 
detailed to disclose the evidentiary basis for the 
court's decision. See Lovegren, 798 P.2d at 771 (trial 
court decision afforded no deference when findings 
inadequate). See also Allred v. Allred, 797 P.2d 1108 
(Utah App. 1990) (failure to enter detailed findings 
concerning child support determination constitutes 
abuse of trial court' discretion). There is, in 
effect, no need of an appellant to marshal the evidence 
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when the findings are so inadequate that they cannot be 
meaningfully Challenged as factual determinations. In 
other words, the way to attack findings which appear 
to be complete and which are sufficiently detailed is 
to marshal the supporting evidence and then demonstrate 
the evidence is inadequate to sustain such findings. 
But where the findings are not of that caliber, 
appellant need not go through a futile marshaling 
exercise. Rather, appellant can simply argue the legal 
insufficiency of the court's findings as framed. 
Id. at 71-72. 
As in Woodward, supra, the Appellants did the best they 
could in marshaling the evidence (Appellants' brief at 29-36, 
Appellants' reply brief at 18-22). However, when the trial court 
fails to make definitive findings as to what contract or 
contracts, he finds valid, it is impossible to fully demonstrate 
the insufficiency of the evidence. Further, when the trial court 
makes a general finding that oral modifications of a contract 
were made and fails to identify the subject matter of the 
amendment, the terms of the amended contract and how the parties 
conducted themselves with regard to the amended contract, it is 
impossible to marshal the evidence. 
It is clear that the trial court failed to define the terms 
of the original contract, the terms of any amendments and 
specifically failed to identify how the parties complied or 
failed to comply with the terms of those agreements. Totally 
absent from the trial court's findings is any reference to 
specific dollar amounts as it relates to the claims and 
counterclaims of the parties. 
With that background, the Appellants did everything 
reasonable under the circumstances to demonstrating the 
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insufficiency of the evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court committed fundamental error with regard to 
its evidentiary rulings that marred the proper resolution of this 
case. The trial court failed to make any specific findings with 
regard to whether the Sales Agreement and Building Agreement were 
integrated and unambiguous. Accordingly, all of the parol 
evidence relating to contemporaneous discussions of the parties 
was improperly admitted. 
Although this Court ruled that extrinsic evidence of 
subsequent agreements is admissible, that finding does not 
compensate for the clear inadequacy of the trial court's findings 
in this case. Although the trial court ruled that there were 
subsequent oral agreements between the parties, the court failed 
to enter any findings as to what the original agreement between 
the parties was and how the amended oral agreement modified the 
terms of the original contract. With only one or two exceptions, 
the trial court failed to even divulge the specific subject 
matter of the purported subsequent oral agreement (walls, 
windows, excavation or the like), let alone the specific terms of 
the subsequent oral agreement. 
The trial court failed to specifically describe how the 
parties acted with regard to their duties under the terms of the 
original and amended contracts. The trial court failed to 
describe how the Plaintiffs and/or Defendants complied with or 
breached the terms of the various agreements. The trial court 
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then failed to make any specific monetary finding as to the 
specific claims made by the Plaintiffs as to each of the items 
included in the written contract. 
It is respectfully submitted that even if parol evidence 
regarding subsequent oral agreements is admissible, such a 
holding by this Court does not adjudicate or resolve the issues 
relating to the inadequacy of the court's findings. 
The Plaintiffs' theory throughout this appeal has been that 
the inadequacy of the findings prevented the proper marshaling of 
the evidence to establish the insufficiency thereof. After all, 
if the trial court fails to reveal what contracts it finds 
binding and fails to describe how the parties failed to comply or 
breach the agreements and the resulting damages, how can an 
appellant be required to marshal evidence in support of non-
specific findings. The findings in this case are clearly 
deficient and prevent an evidentiary analysis. 
Based upon this Court's failure to decide the issue of the 
inadequacy of the court's findings and the failure to evaluate 
the impossibility of properly marshaling the evidence based upon 
non-specific findings, the Petition for Rehearing should be 
granted and the Decision of the lower court reversed. 
DATED this day of May, 1995. 
Michael J. Petro, Esq. 
Attorney for Appellants 
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1995. 
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